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INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to a market
economy brought significant changes to the legal frameworks of most
* Stanimir N. Kostov is a 2009 J.D. candidate at the William & Mary School of Law.
Mr. Kostov received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Commerce from the University of
Virginia in 2004.
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countries in Eastern and Central Europe. One notable aspect of these
changes is the process of long-term restructuring of local government
units to reflect the new democratic values.' While the restructuring is
occurring at a different pace in each of the countries in the region, the
general trend is to transfer more power away from the national govern-
ments to the municipalities. Yet, this reform stopped short of allowing
local governments to play a more decisive role in issues that directly affect
the interests of their constituents but which also presents a question of
national importance.2
This Note considers the construction of oil pipelines and other large
infrastructure projects and the level of municipal involvement in their
planning process. Due to the significant environmental impact of such proj-
ects, this is one of the most frequent contexts in which conflicts between
the two levels of government arise. The Note focuses on the responses of
the Bulgarian and Russian governments when the local authorities de-
manded a greater control over the location of the Burgas-Alexandroupoli3
and the Pacific pipelines,4 as well as the existing legal frameworks in which
these responses were made.5 The Note then examines the pros6 and cons7
of increasing the role of local governments in deciding whether a partic-
ular project should be allowed within their territory, and also examines
how Australia' and the European Union9 have addressed similar issues.
DISCUSSION
Despite the increased risk of corruption and insufficient resources
on the local level, municipal governments are in a better position to de-
termine the most appropriate location for proposed large infrastructure
1Dan Durning, New Trends in Local Government in Western and Eastern Europe, PUBLIUS,
Winter 1994, at 96, 96-97, available at httpJ/www.jstor.org/stable/3330708.
'See Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act, No. 90 (1996) (Bulg.) avail-
able at http'/unpanl.un.orgmtradoc/groups/public/documentUNTC/UNPAN016312.pdf;
Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Russian Citizens to
Participate in the Referendum, 1997, art. 13 (Russ.) (amended 2003), available at httpJ/
www.democracy.ru/english/library/laws/bg-law-eng/page2.html.
'See infra Part I.
' See infra Part II.
5 For the Bulgarian legal framework, see infra Part I.B. For the Russian legal framework,
see infra Part II.C.
6 See infra Part III.B.
7 See infra Part III.A.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 See infra Part V.
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projects such as pipelines. Because their constituency consists of the local
community, these governments are likely to select an option that is not
only beneficial to the local economy but is also the least harmful to the
environment. However, because of the undisputed importance of trans-
national pipelines, national governments should retain the power to block
municipal decisions that threaten the realization of the project.
I. BULGARIA AND THE BURGAS-ALEXANDROUPOLI PIPELINE
A. Project Description
Recognizing Bulgaria's strategic geographic location on the border
of Europe and Asia, the country's first democratic governments set the
ambitious goal of making Bulgaria one of Europe's key energy players. °
Because Bulgaria lacks oil and gas resources of its own,' the government
concentrated its efforts on two alternative strategies. The first strategy
was to export low-cost electricity to the other Balkan Peninsula states
from its Kozludui Nuclear Power Plant. 2 The second strategy aimed to
take direct advantage of Bulgaria's location by exploring the opportunity
to transport oil and gas from Russia and other former Soviet republics to
Western Europe. Two oil pipeline projects have been of particular interest
to Bulgaria. Both provide for Bulgaria to receive oil tankers at its Black
Sea port of Burgas and then transport it overland via pipes. The first pipe-
line will take the oil to the Greek port ofAlexandroupoli, thus circumvent-
ing the busy Bosporus straits. 3 The second pipeline, commonly referred
to as the AMBO, will carry the oil through Bulgaria and Macedonia and
will end on the Albanian Adriatic coast at the port of Vlore. 4
'0 MINISTRY OF ENERGY AND ENERGY RES., ENERGY STRATEGY OF BULGARIA 23-32 (1999),
[hereinafter MINISTRY OF ENERGY] available at http://www.seea.government.bg/documents
EnegyStrategyEN.pdf.
" See Energy in South East Europe-Oil and Gas Networks, http'J/www.seerecon.org/
infrastructure/sectors/energy/oilgas.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
2 MINISTRY OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 30-32. In the following decade, Bulgaria also
provided for the construction of a second nuclear facility in the town of Belene. Bulgarian
Government Issues Belene Construction Permit, WORLD NUcLEAR NEWS, July 15, 2008,
h t tp://w w w. world - nuclear - news. org/N N - B u 1 g a r i a n - government
_issuesBeleneconstructionpermit-1507085.html.
is The Greens: European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, Dirty Energy: New
Pipeline to Bring Russian Oil to Mediterranean (Mar. 21, 2007), http'//www.greens-efa
.org/cms/default/dok/174/174057.dirty-energy@en.htm [hereinafter The Greens].
14 ENERGY INFO ADMIN, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1, 2 (2006),
available at http/www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/SEEurope/pdf.
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While AMBO's viability is still being explored, 5 the Burgas-
Alexandroupoli project has already gained the approval of all partici-
pating countries. 6 On March 15, 2007, Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece
signed a pipeline construction agreement. 7 The agreement provides that
51% of the shares will be held by Russia and the following companies:
Gaspromneft, Rosneft and Transneft. 5 Bulgarian companies Bulgargas
and Universal Terminal Burgas will receive 24.5%. While the remaining
shares will be held by Greek stakeholders."s The pipeline will have a total
length of 288 km, with 161 km passing through the territory of Bulgaria,
and is estimated to be completed by 2011.20
The project received opposition from the start.2' Right wing political
parties and ecologists on the national level initially led this opposition.22
They argued that the project will have harmful effects on the environment
and will also be economically detrimental to the country. 23 As the media
publicized more details about the project, the citizens and government of
the Burgas municipality began to voice concerns about the environmental
impact of the pipeline.24
Burgas is Bulgaria's fourth largest city and plays an important role
in its economy.25 Along with its significance as a transportation hub,26 the
15 Kosovo's declaration of independence has recently raised concerns about the stability
of Macedonia, which is a country with a significant Albanian minority. See Risto Karajkov,
Macedonia Quiet for Now on Kosovo's Independence, WORLDPRESS.ORG, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/3076.cfin. These concerns may pose an additional
setback to this project, at least for the short term.
16 Michaletos loannis, Burgas-Alexandroupoli Pipeline: Current Role of Bulgaria in
Southeast Europe, RESEARCH INsTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES, http:/l
rieas.gr/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=228&Itemid=42 (last visited
Sept. 23, 2008).
17 Id.
18 id.
19 Id.20 /d.
21 Petar Kostadinov, Pipeline Referendum in Bulgaria's Bourgas, SOFIA ECHO, July 16,
2007, http://sofiaecho.com/article/pipeline-referendum-in-bulgarias-bourgas/id23756/
catid_5.
22 Id.
23 Id.
' See 300 ProtestAgainst Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline, NOVINITE, Feb. 10, 2008,
httpJ/www.novinite.com/viewnews.php?id=90240.
' The Cities Alliance, Liveable Cities: The Benefits of Urban Environmental Planning
73 (2007), available at http'//www.citiesalliance.org/activities-output/topics/cds/liveable-
cities.html.
2 See Bourgas, Bulgaria, http'//www.bulgariansearesorts.com/resorts/bourgas (last visited
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city is also a center for the tourist and fishing industries.27 For these
reasons, the citizens of Burgas are especially sensitive to environmental
issues. In this case, the citizens' concerns stem primarily from the threat of
oil spills in the bay of Burgas from the tankers that delivering the product
to the pipeline terminal as well as from location of the terminal itself.'
In response to public pressure regarding the project, the Burgas
Municipal Council announced on July 5, 2007, that the city was to hold
a local referendum, in accordance with Article 17 of the Local Government
Act, on whether the pipeline should be allowed through its territory.29
The Council also demanded that the Ministry of Regional Development
and Public Works, the administrative entity in charge of the project,
release the results of the mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment
that the Ministry of Environment and Water prepared for the pipeline. S°
The Minister of Environment and Water Affairs, Djevdet Chakurov,
responded that the referendum would not influence the construction of the
pipeline because the project is one of strategic national importance.3' In
addition, government officials contended that the result of the referendum
would be moot because it would be superceded by the Pipeline Construction
Agreement signed by Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria.32
An analysis of the current Bulgarian legislation 33 suggests that the
national government had the stronger argument in this case. In fact, after
a prolonged discussion on the issue, on July 27, 2007, the Municipal Council
announced that it was abandoning its decision to hold a referendum.34
Sept. 23, 2008). In addition to being a major seaport, Burgas is home to one of the country's
busiest airports and is an important railroad hub. Id.
21 See Bulgaria's Minister Djevdet Chakurov Will Not Approve an Environmental Impact
Assessment, PROFIT BG, Aug. 30, 2007, http:/www.profit.bglindex.php?aid=1533.
21 See id.; The Greens, supra note 13.
29 Kostadinov, supra note 21.
30/d.
31 Elitsa Grancharova, Just Say "No," SOFIA ECHO, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.sofiaecho
.com/article/j ust-say-no/id_27696/catid_5.
32 Id.
See infra Part I.B.
Bourgas-Alexandroupolis Project Referendum in Bulgaria Abolished, SOFIA ECHO, July27,
2007, http://www.sofiaecho.com/article/bourgas-alexandroupolis-project-referendum-in-
bulgaria-abolished/id24091/catid_67. Note that in 2008, Burgas's new mayor reversed
the decision of the previous administration and a local referendum was in fact held. How-
ever, the results were considered void because fewer than 50% of the eligible voters partici-
pated in the vote, as required by law. And while the overwhelming majority of those who
did vote voted against the construction, the national government clearly indicated that
the referendum would have no impact on its decision on the pipeline. It also reiterated that
3532008]
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B. Current Bulgarian Legislation on the Issue
In 1991, the Seventh Grand National Assembly adopted Bulgaria's
new constitution.35 This constitution replaced the 1971 communist version
and accorded the Bulgarian citizens rights similar to those of citizens
of a modern European democracy.36 With regard to the issues at hand,
Article 55 guarantees the right to a "healthy and favorable" environ-
ment.3" Article 120 allows citizens to "challenge any administrative act
which affects them, except those listed expressly by the laws."3" It is clear
that these constitutional guarantees, while supporting Burgas's position,
are too broad to support their argument without additional, more specific
legislative acts.
Bulgaria's Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act
clarifies the authority of Bulgarian municipalities. 39 Article 22 allows local
governments to "adopt rules, regulations, resolutions, and instructions on
issues of local importance."' The prerequisite is that the local regulation
must provide rules for activities of legal and physical persons that are
linked with the historical or ecological characteristics of the area.4' Essen-
tially, "the local regulation can set stronger environmental standards
than national guidelines only when it is necessary because of the local
"international matters could not be resolved with municipal referendum." Void Referendum
in Bulgaria's Burgas Rejects Overwhelmingly Oil Pipeline, NovINrTE, Feb. 18,2008, httpJ/
www.novinite.com/viewnews.php?id=90495 [hereinafter Void Referendum].
15 See KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BULGARIA [Constitution], available at http://www
.parliament.bg/?page=const&lng=en.
" The 1971 constitution was widely considered by the Bulgarian citizens to be undemocratic
and authoritarian because it solidified the Bulgarian Communist Party as the "leading
force in society and the state." BULGARIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 181 (Glenn E. Curtis ed.,
Federal Research Division Library of Congress 2nd ed. 1992), available at httpJ/
countrystudies.us/bulgaria/45.htm.
37 KONSTITUTSIANAREPUBLICA BULGARIA art. 55, available at http://www.parliament.bg/
?page=const&lng=en.
3MId. art. 120.9 Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act, No. 90 (1996) (Bulg.), available
at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/publidocument/fUNTC/LrJNPAN016312. pdf. The
act can also be translated as the Self-Government Act.
o Alexander Kodjabashev, Bulgaria, in DOORS TO DEMOCRACY: CURRENT TRENDS AND
PRACTICES IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENvRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE 109, 110 (1998), available at httpJ/www.rec.org/REC/Publications/
PPDoors/CEE/PPDoorsCEE.pdf. See KONSTrruTsIA NA REPUBLICA BULGARIA art. 22.41 See Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act art. 21(1)(13) (1996), available
at http'J/unpan.un.org/intradoc/groups/pubhldocuments/UNTC/UNPAN016312.pdf.
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conditions."42 The pipeline project seems to fall within the purview of the
Act because the Bay of Burgas has unique historical, ecological, and social
characteristics. Specifically, it is essential for the tourism and fishing indus-
tries and thus provides a substantial portion of local residents' income.'
However, Articles 21 and 22 alone are not sufficient to justify a
referendum on the pipeline project. Article 17 addresses the issue of local
referendums." Specifically, it states that local referendums are allowed
in pursuance of Article 11, which empowers municipalities to protect the
environment and natural resources.45 However, this authority is extended
only to issues of local importance.46
Article 200 of the 2003 Law on Energy dispels any doubt that pipe-
lines are an issue of national, not local, importance.47 It provides that
the layout and safe operation of oil pipelines and oil product
pipelines in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria shall
be regulated in an ordinance adopted by the Council of
Ministers upon proposal by the Minister of Energy and
Energy Resources and the Chairperson of the State Agency
of Meteorology and Technical Supervision.4"
It is clear that while Bulgaria's legislation grants constitutional guarantees
for environmental protection and a certain degree of municipal authority
to act on environmental issues, pipeline construction project decisions
remain entirely within the purview of the national government.
It is also important to note that along with the legislation just
discussed, there are broader government structural issues that present
obstacles to municipal exercise of authority in this case. A municipality
that gets in a conflict with the national government often faces the
threat of budgetary constraints.49 As there are no direct local taxes, local
governments depend on the national government for most of their rev-
42 Kodjabashev, supra note 40.
Bulgaria's Minister Djevdet Chakurov Will not Approve an Environmental Impact
Assessment, supra note 27.
"See Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act art. 17, available at http://
unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016312.pdf.4 5 See id. art. 11, 17.
"Id. art. 17.
4' Law on Energy, No. 107 (2003) (Buig.), art. 200, available at http://www.erranet.org/
index.php?name=OE-eLibrary&file=download&id=2946&keret=N&showheader=N.
48Id.
4 See Kodjabashev, supra note 40.
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enues and are therefore vulnerable to pressure." And while the threat
of retributive action from the national government would essentially
amount to political blackmail and would not be legal, this possibility is
far from being a mere theory."' It is not difficult to imagine similar treat-
ment in the case of a municipality that stands in the way of an important
national infrastructure project.
II. RussIA AND THE PACIFIC PIPELINE
A. Project Description
The Russian Federation is undoubtedly one of the key players on
the energy scene.52 As of 2006, it has the eighth largest oil reserves53 and
the largest natural gas reserves in the world.54 Because gas is the fastest
growing fuel source in Europe, Russia now holds the key to the European
Union's future economic prosperity.5" Energy is also the single most im-
portant reason why Russia's economy has experienced such a substantial
growth under President Putin.56
Recognizing the possibility that Europe will seek a way to limit its
dependence on Russian energy resources," and for the potential profits
50 See id.
51 The Bulgarian media frequently voice concerns about mayors who represent political
parties that are in opposition on the national level and who allege that because of their
affiliation, the national government limits funding for their cities with the intention of turn-
ing the public against them. Muravei Privatizira Mestnite Bjudjeti [Muravei Privatized the
Local Budgets], STANDART NEWS, July 24, 2001, https://www.standartnews.com/archive/
2001/07/24/interview/s3077_2.htm.
52 See generally The Russian Federation, THE BROOKINGS FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES
ENERGY SECURITY SERIES, Oct. 2006, at 1, 1-2, 5.
" See Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, 103 OIL & GAS J. 20, 24-25 (2005)(providing data for world oil and gas reserves); Infoplease.com, Greatest Oil Reserves by
Country 2006, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0872964.html (last visited Sept. 25,2008).
' See Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, supra note 53; Infoplease, supra note 53.
55 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007 39, 45 (2007),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/nat-gas.html.
56 See ROBERT PIROG, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS CHALLENGES 1-4
(2007), available at httpJ/www.fas.org/sgpcrs/row/RL33212.pdf.
5 See Stefan Nicola, Analysis: Europe's Pipeline War, United Press International, Feb. 5,
2008, http://www.upi.comInternationalSecurity/Energy/Analysis/2008/02/05/analysis
_europes.pipeline-war/2456/. Europe's most significant effort to decrease its dependence
on Russian energy is the Nabucco natural gas pipeline. The idea behind the project is to
transport gas supplied by Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Syria from
Turkey to Austria. And while the project presents some clear economic benefits to the
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in other markets, the Russian government has looked to the East. On
December 31, 2004, Russia announced its decision to build the longest
pipeline in the world, which will transport oil from Siberia to the Sea of
Japan.58 The oil will then be shipped via tankers to potential customers
in the Pacific such as Japan, Korea, and the United States.59 The pipe-
line will be constructed by the state-owned Transneft, and was originally
planned to end in Southwest Primorye region on the Amur Bay near the
city of Vladivostok.6"
This is the largest infrastructure project in Russia's history and is
estimated to cost $11.5-$15 billion.6' Once completed, the pipeline will cross
fifty rivers and include thirty-two pumping stations. 62 The pipeline "will
have the potential to transport as much as 56 millions tons of oil a year
from the town of Tayshet-400 kilometers north-west of Lake Baikal-to
the Sea of Japan. "63
B. Conflict
Local authorities and conservationists argue that selecting
Perevoznaya Bay as a terminal site makes it seventeen times more likely
that an oil spill will occur than if one of the alternative sites is selected. 4
They also contend that "[i] t would be much more efficient to utilize already
existing infrastructure in the industrialised Nakhodka region, where oil
terminals already operate."" In addition to the danger of oil spills at the
terminal site, residents and local environmental organizations argue that
the proposed location of the pipeline encroaches on the habitat of the en-
dangered Amur leopard, the most endangered cat on Earth.6
European Union, its future is far from certain. Id. (describing the project, as well as
Russia's alternative proposal, which aims at preventing the construction of Nabucco).
' See Tigris Foundation, Pacific Pipeline Campaign Overview, http'//www.tigrisfoundation
.nllcms/publishlcontent/showpage.asp?pageID=24 (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
" WWF News Centre, World's Longest Oil Pipeline Re-routed in Russia's Far East,
Endangered Leopard Habitat Spared, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.panda.org/news-facts/
newsroom/index.cfm?uNewsID=96540.
o Tigris Foundation, supra note 58.
61 WWF News Centre, supra note 59.
62 Id.
63 Id.
' Tigris Foundation, supra note 58.
65 Id.
' Id.; see also WWF News Centre, supra note 59.
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To address its citizens' concerns, the government of the Primorye
region, like the government in Burgas, attempted to hold a local referen-
dum on the location of the pipeline. This referendum, too, was rejected by
the national government on the grounds that it was attempting to address
an issue of national importance.67
It is important to note that the national government ultimately
revised its decision. On March 13, 2007 Russia's federal service for
ecological, technical, and atomic supervision announced that the pipeline
terminal will now end at Kozmino Bay and thus will spare the last re-
maining habitat of the endangered Amur leopard.6" There is little doubt,
however, that this change of position was prompted by the pressure
exerted from international environmental organizations, such as the
World Wide Fund for Nature, and not by the efforts of the citizens of
Primorye to protect their local environment.69 Therefore, problems of a
similar nature might occur in the future and an examination of Russia's
current legislation concerning this issue is warranted.
C. Current Russian Legislation on the Issue
The citizens of the Russian Federation adopted the current version
of their constitution through a direct vote in 1993.70 Article 71 of this con-
stitution "assigns to the federal government those powers that concern the
country as a whole,"7 ' while Article 130 allows for local self-government
for issues of local importanceY.7 The constitution further provides that
self-government should be "exercised by citizens through a referendum,
election, other forms of direct expression of the will of the people, through
elected and other bodies of local self-government."73
Article 13 of the Law On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights
and the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to Participate in a
67 Tigris Foundation, supra note 58.
8 WWF News Centre, supra note 59.69Id. The World Wide Fund for Nature was formerly the World Wildlife Fund; it is still
commonly referred to as the WWF. WWF Statues, http://www.panda.orgaboutwwf/who
_weare/organizationstatutes/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
70 Constitution of the Russian Federation Homepage, http://www.constitution.ru/en/
10003000-01.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).71 MARAT SALiKOv, THE RussIAN FEDERAL SYSTEM: SUB-NATIONAL AND LocAL LEVELS 6,
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/salikov.pdf; see Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi
Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Const.] art. 71.
72 Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Const.] art. 130.
73 id.
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Referendum further clarifies the question of local referendums by stating
that "[iissues may be submitted to a referendum of a Subject of the Russian
Federation if they are within the jurisdiction of the Subject of the Russian
Federation. Issues may be submitted to a local referendum if they are
within the jurisdiction of the local self-government."" Once again, there
is no doubt that the pipeline construction layout is considered an issue
of national importance and is therefore beyond the authority of the
Primorye provincial government. As mentioned above, the pipeline is the
most expensive infrastructure project in Russia's history and with its length
of 4200 km,7 it spans across the borders of a number of the country's re-
gions and provinces. The pipeline will also be an essential tool in Russia's
strategy of expanding its importance in the world energy markets.76
Finally, it is important to note that Article 132 of Russia's
Constitution specifically empowers local governments to "implement the
local budgets, introduce local taxes and dues."" This, of course, makes
Russian sub-national governmental units less dependent on the national
government than their Bulgarian counterparts. 78 Therefore, at least theo-
retically, they should be somewhat less vulnerable to pressure to comply
with national expectations. However, this effect is counterbalanced by
the great role that the national government plays in selecting candidates
for local authority positions.79
III. ANALYZING THE PROS AND CONS OF AMENDING THE LEGISLATION
OF BULGARIA AND RUSSIA TO ALLOW FOR GREATER MUNICIPAL
CONTROL
The recent experiences of Bulgaria and Russia with pipeline con-
struction projects indicate that the current relevant legislation of the two
countries allows sub-national governmental units to play only a marginal
7" Law on Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Russian Citizens to
Participate in the Referendum, 1997, art. 13, available at http'//www.democracy.ru/
english/library/laws/bg-jaweng/page2.html#P91_28624 (emphasis added).
" WWF News Centre, supra note 59.76 See generally ISABEL GORST, THE ENERGY DIMENSION IN RuSsIAN GLOBAL STRATEGY-
RUSSIAN PipELiNE STRATEGIES: BuSINESS VERSUS POLITICS (2004), available at httpJ/www
.rice.edulenergy/publicationsdocs/PECGorst_10_2004.pdf.
7' Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Const.] art. 132. (Russ.).
71 See supra Part I.B.
71 See Laura Belin, Russia: Pro-Kremlin Party May Gain Voice in Appointing Governors,
RADIO FREE EUROPE, Oct. 10, 2005, httpJ/www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/10/a7448207-
95ce-4920-9aaa-e035d6635123.html.
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role in the layout decision making process. This section analyzes the pos-
sible advantages and disadvantages of increasing municipal and provincial
control in accordance with the general political liberalization since the
collapse of communism.
A. Cons
One of the most obvious problems with allowing greater local control
stems from corruption. While corruption is generally a serious issue for
any governmental unit in Eastern Europe, it is undisputed that municipal
governments are more prone to it than their national counterparts.80 In
addition, these authorities are more susceptible to lobbying pressure for
lower environmental standards by economically powerful industries.8'
Interestingly, it also appears that, unlike in Western Europe and the United
States, the supervision by the citizens over their municipal council repre-
sentatives is smaller as compared to the national level.82 Furthermore,
in addition to the lower level of scrutiny, local governments and their con-
stituents also lack the enforcement capabilities enjoyed by their national
counterparts.' While anticorruption laws obviously apply with equal force
regardless of the governmental unit, it is easy to imagine that economies
in transition, such as the ones in Eastern Europe, would not have suffi-
cient resources to fight corruption at every level.'
Of course, limited financial resources affect the local government's
decision making capabilities in other respects as well. One obvious question
is whether a municipality or a province will be able to afford an adequate
evaluation of the true environmental or economic impact of a proposed
project. This issue extends beyond purely financial resources and includes
problems with human capital. While unemployment in Eastern Europe
remains high, most countries in the region have experienced difficulties
in finding workers who are qualified and motivated to meet challenges
o Alex Dehgan, A Criticism of the New Mechanisms for Environmental Protection in the
Russian Federation, 19 REV. CENT. & E. EuR. L. 661, 700 (1993).81 Id. at 701.
82 This can probably be explained by the fact that Eastern Europeans are accustomed to
the centralized government model, in which local governments play only nominal roles.
83 See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, CORRUFION AN ANTi-CORRUPTION PoLIcY IN BULGARIA 85-
87,130-31(2002), available at http'//www.eumap.org/reports/2002/corruption/mternational/
sections/bulgaria/2002_c_bulgaria.pdf.
' Because international scrutiny is much stronger on the national level, it is logical to
expect that most of the resources for combating corruption would be channeled there.
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associated with working in a free market economy." Needless to say, the
impact of this problem is even more severe on the municipal level where
few positions provide advancement opportunities that are lucrative enough
to compete with the private sector.86 However, the problem with limited
resources can be partially mitigated with changes to the existing self-
government legislation.
One possible solution to the problem of limited financial and human
resources on the municipal level would be to amend existing legislation
to require the national government to provide the necessary assistance.
However, for the evaluation process to be effective, the legislation should
include safeguards to avoid improper interference by national authorities
in the local decision making process. In other words, the national govern-
ment should not be allowed to attach unreasonable restrictions on the use
of the financial assistance or to attempt to influence the evaluation by
selecting the environmental experts to conduct the evaluation.
Finally, increasing municipal control over infrastructure projects
that go beyond the municipal borders will inevitably create some danger
of conflicts with other municipalities and sub-national governmental units.
For example, deciding on a certain location for a pipeline limits the loca-
tion choices available to the municipality that is further down the line.
In more extreme cases, some location choices will necessitate the partici-
pation of municipalities that otherwise would not have been involved. And
in the most extreme case, a location that presents the greatest benefit to
one municipality may render the overall project impermissibly expensive
or unprofitable. This point demonstrates that increasing municipal control
should not mean allowing full control. At the very least, the national gov-
ernment should retain a veto power that would allow it to act as a final,
impartial arbiter when conflicts of this nature arise.
B. Pros
The most obvious benefit of increasing sub-national government
control over pipeline construction stems from greater environmental
' See Jochen Luypaert, Eastern Europe Might Never Catch Up, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 16,
2007, available at httpJ/www.businessweek.com (search for"Eastern Europe Might Never
Catch Up"; follow title hyperlink); see also UNEMPLOYMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND THE
LABOR MARKET IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA (Simon Commander & Fabrizio Coricelli
eds., 1995) (examining the levels and causes of unemployment in the region).
6 See Rural Regions Development: From General Problems to Specific Opportunities,
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAND PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM INrrIATIVE, May 22, 2007, http://gi.osi
.hu/documents.php?id=1681.
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concern at that level. It makes economic and social sense that the envi-
ronment will be protected the most by those who have the highest stakes
in it. Therefore, it is easy to predict that local communities and their rep-
resentatives would be more concerned about the environment where they
live. They also are likely to possess a more in-depth knowledge of local en-
vironmental and meteorological peculiarities that could impact the project.
Secondly, allowing a greater degree of self-government is more in
line with the principles of democracy. Because a pipeline location deci-
sion is likely to have a significant impact on the local community, it
makes more political sense if the decision is made as close to the people
as possible. This also allows for a more extensive constituent consulta-
tion process and de-creases administrative and overhead costs that are
inherent to decision-making.
While an increased degree of self-government would generally be
beneficial to most countries in the world, it would be especially valuable
in Eastern Europe where political apathy has emerged as a new and un-
expected threat to these young democracies." This is true because greater
municipal control over important infrastructure projects is likely to con-
vince people that they can have a more substantive impact on their econ-
omy, thus motivating them to participate actively in the political process.
Decision making at the municipal level will also result in less inter-
ference with other important industries. As with environmental concerns,
municipalities are likely to have greater knowledge of local industries and
may be better equipped to protect them from the negative effects of pipe-
line construction. For example, Burgas municipality is likely to be in the
best position to determine the pipeline location that would have the least
detrimental effects to its interests in the tourist and fishing industries.
IV. THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL
As a federation, Australia has a three-tier government structure. 8
However, while the federal and state governments have clearly delineated
powers guaranteed by the country's constitution, the local government
lacks such constitutional legitimacy. 9 This fact has prompted many to
87 See Liz Barrett, Corruption in Eastern Europe, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN REFORM BULLETIN,
February 2000, http:/www.cer.org.uk/articles/n.10 2.html.
" See ESSORTMENT, The Australian Government Structure, http://www.essortment
.comaustraliangover-rbpt.htm (last visited on Sept. 8, 2008).
" Michael Longo, Subsidiary and Local Environmental Governance: A Comparative and
Reform Perspective, 18 U. TAS. L. REv. 225, 238-39 (1999).
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call for a constitutional amendment that would recognize a certain degree
of autonomy for the local government units.' It is unlikely, however, that
such a change will occur in the near future, because the federal govern-
ment is reluctant to support it. 9 '
Despite the local governments' dependence on the constitutional
power of the states, they have been recognized as important players in
environmental management.92 Traditionally, they have been accorded
significant discretion in the areas of waste disposal, recycling, building
and land development, and road construction.9
In 1997, Australia also adopted environmental legislation that
limited the federal government's involvement in environmental policy to
issues of national importance. 4 And while similar formulations appear in
the legislation of both Bulgaria and Russia,95 there is one important dif-
ference. To avoid any possible uncertainty regarding the scope of federal
power, Australia chose a rather strict and narrow definition of "national
significance" in its environmental law. The definition includes:
* World Heritage properties;
* Ramsar wetlands of international importance;
* Nationally threatened species and ecological
communities;
• Migratory species protected under international
agreements;
* Nuclear actions; and
* Commonwealth marine environment.96
It is clear that this short list leaves the vast majority of important
decisions relating to pipeline layout and construction to the sub-national
government units. More specifically, due to the lack of constitutionally pro-
vided autonomy for the local governments, the primary decision-making
power rests with the intermediate government level, the Australian states.97
90/d.
9 1 Id.
92 Id. at 238.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 239.
9 See Kodjabashev, supra note 40 (allowing local governments to address environmental
issues of local importance); see also Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Const.]
art. 71.
9 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999, c. 2, p. 3, div. 1 (Austl.).
7 Longo, supra note 89, at 240-41.
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This model admittedly does not guarantee that the state govern-
ments will share the responsibility for pipeline location decisions with their
municipal counterparts." And even when they do, that responsibility could
be taken away at any time in the absence of constitutional protections. 99
Despite the fact that this is probably not the optimal solution to the power
allocation problem between the different levels of government, this model
has some obvious advantages over the ones currently in place in Bulgaria
and Russia.
Most importantly, the inclusion of a clear and narrow definition
of "issues of national significance" in environmental legislation ensures
that the national governments would not attempt to increase the scope
of their authority at the expense of the sub-national levels. °° Currently,
in both Bulgaria and Russia there is no limitation on what can be consid-
ered a nationally important question.'0 ' Therefore, their national govern-
ments could stake a claim on any infrastructure project by simply exag-
gerating its importance.
Secondly, the Australian model provides for greater efficiency and
effectiveness in solving environmental problems. This is because, in most
cases, the state governments would be in a better position to understand
local environmental concerns than their national counterparts.' 2 Because
lower levels of government are normally burdened with less bureaucratic
red tape, they would also be able to react more quickly to issues that re-
quire immediate attention.0 3 Additionally, this model is more democratic
because it brings the decision-making process closer to the people who
are most affected by the infrastructure projects. 0 4
Of course, an even more efficient and democratic solution would
be to transfer most of the power to the municipal units, and not to the
states. However, considering Bulgaria and Russia's national governments'
strong opposition to sharing control over key infrastructure projects-as
9 Id. at 243.
9 Id.
" See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999, c. 2, p. 3, div. 1
(Austl.).1o0 Seegenerally Kodjabashev, supra note 40. See also, Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Konst. RFI [Const.] art. 71.
10 2 This makes sense because the level of communication between local and state govern-
ments and their constituents is generally much higher than on the national level.
" Of course, this is difficult to measure, but it is logical to assume that local governments
that have smaller administrative organs would also have less sophisticated and burden-
some bureaucratic procedures.
1'4 Longo, supra note 89, at 242.
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evidenced by their reactions to the opposition of the pipeline projects-a
compromise that transfers some of the decision making authority to an
intermediate government level may be more realistic in the short-term.
V. LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. The Principle of Subsidiarity
Although not exactly a "state," the European Union ("EU") provides
useful lessons with regard to the allocation of decision making authority
between the different levels of government. One such lesson stems from
the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is defined in Article 5 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community °5 and is intended to ensure
that political actions are taken as closely to the citizens of the Union as
possible.0 6 In other words, an EU institution is only allowed to make a
decision on an issue if it can prove that it can do so in a more effective way
than any national, regional or local governmental unit.'0 7 Because this
approach is inherently democratic, it has been accepted as one of the
fundamental principals of the European Union as an institution.'0 8
From a strictly legal standpoint, the principle of subsidiarity must
only be applied in the relationships between the European Union institu-
tions and the member states.'O9 In other words, there is no requirement for
the national governments of the member states to delegate authority to
their local counterparts unless a task can be accomplished more effec-
tively and efficiently on the national level. "0 From a political perspective,
however, the principle undoubtedly has a positive impact on municipali-
ties because constituents now expect political actions to be taken as close
to them as possible."'
105 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 5, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. ( 340)
5 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
106 Europa.eu, Glossary-Subsidiarity, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity
_en.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
107 Id.
108 Luxemburg Presidency of the Counsel of the European Union 2005, Glossary:
Subsidiarity, httpJ/www.eu2005.lu/en/savoix-ueglossaire/glossaire-shndey-html#Susidiarity
(last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
109 LocAL GOVERNMENT IN IRELAND: INSIDE OuT 407 (Mark Callanan & Justin K Keogan
eds., Institute of Public Administration 2003).
110 Id.
111 Id.
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In fact, this expectation has prompted some EU member states
to make subsidiarity a part of their national legislation. One prominent
example is Italy, whose Parliament approved a sweeping constitutional
reform in 2001.112 As part of this reform, the Constitution now requires
that "administrative functions belong to the municipalities except when
they are conferred to provinces, metropolitan cities, regions, or the state
in order to guarantee uniform practice."" 3 And while these changes have
created some uncertainty with regard to the exact roles of the different
levels of government," 4 one cannot dispute that they bring the country
in the direction of greater democracy and decentralization.
The principle of subsidiarity can also serve as a helpful tool in
outlining the parameters of local and national authority in Bulgaria and
Russia. Such an approach can be especially useful in large infrastructure
projects that involve multiple stages of development. Allocating respon-
sibility for each of these stages to the level of government that is closest
to the citizens that can accomplish them most effectively and efficiently
would not only decrease the project's cost, but also likely result in
greater environmental protection." 5
It is hard to predict whether subsidiarity can gain acceptance by
the leadership of Bulgaria and Russia. However, at least in the case of
Bulgaria, the pressure on the national government for more decentral-
ization is likely to increase in the near future as the public becomes more
familiar with the values and principles of the European Union." 6
B. The Committee of the Regions
In 1994, the European Union created the Committee of the Regions
("the Committee") to reaffirm its commitment to transferring more author-
"' See Tania Groppi & Nicoletta Scattone, Italy: The Subsidiarity Principle, 4 INTL. J.
CONST. L. 131, 131-137 (2006).113 Costituzione [COST.] art. 118 (Italy), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/
it00000_.html.114 See Groppi & Scattone, supra note 112 at 134.
.1. See supra Part III.B (discussing why greater participation by local governments in
infrastructure projects leads to better environmental protection).
"
6 Bulgaria became a full member of the European Union as part of its Fifth Enlargement
on January 1, 2007. See EUROPA: Rapid-Press Release, Commission Confirms Bulgaria's
and Romania's EU Accession on 1 January 2007, Sept. 26,2006, http'//europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1257&format=HTML&aged=O&language=EN
&guiLanguage=en.
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ity to the local and regional government levels." 7 As an advisory body
consisting of local officials from different Member States, the Committee
consults with other EU institutions on matters concerning regional and
local policy, including environmental questions." 8 Both the Commission and
the Council of the European Union are required to consult the Committee
on topics of direct relevance to local authorities."9 In addition, they can also
request consultation on any other issue. 2 Alternatively, the Committee
is authorized to adopt opinions on its own initiative and present them to
the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament.'2 '
It is important to note that even though each state's representa-
tives to the Committee are nominated by their national governments, they
are expected to work independently from them.'22 They are appointed by
the Council of the European Union for a term of four years and may be re-
appointed.'23 In addition, the representatives must have a mandate from
the local authority they represent and must be accountable to them.1
24
Admittedly, the role of the Committee is quite limited due to its
advisory nature. In other words, even though the Commission and the
Council are required to consult in certain instances, they are not required
to follow its recommendations.' 25 In addition, the requirement that the
members of the Committee be nominated by their respective national gov-
ernments may be problematic because of the potential for interference
in the Committee's work. 26 However, the existence of the Committee is an
important indicator that the European Union has recognized the necessity
of including sub-national governmental units in creating environmental
policy and legislation. Moreover, the role of the Committee is likely to
increase in the future in light of the growing criticism of the European
Union for becoming too centralized and removed from its citizens. 27
117 Europa.eu, European Union Institutions & Other Bodies-The Committee of the Re-
gions, httpJ/europa.eu/institutionsconsultativecorfndexen.htm (last visited Sept. 30,2008).118 Id.
119 Id.
120 id.
121 Id.
122 id.
123 Europa.eu, supra note 117.
124 id.
125 id.
126 Despite the Committee's theoretical independence, it is easy to imagine that members
who seek reappointment would be reluctant to openly challenge their national governments.
127 This criticism was one of the primary reasons for the rejection of the proposed EU
Constitution by the citizens of the Netherlands in 2005. See, e.g., Dutch PM: EU
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Needless to say, the Committee has the potential to provide direct
benefits to Bulgaria's municipalities. As the European Union's newest
member,12 Bulgaria is entitled to a twelve-member representation on
the Committee.'29 Such a forum presents an excellent opportunity for
leaders of local government units to voice their concerns against actions
taken by the national government. And while the Committee is unable to
adopt binding opinions to EU institutions or member states, 3 ° an adverse
advisory opinion can potentially damage a member state's reputation in
the Union and is likely to deter blatantly abusive practices on the part of
national authorities.
VI. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY CHANGES
The analysis above indicates that there are a number of strong
arguments both in favor of and against increasing municipal control over
pipeline location decisions.' 3' However, the possible advantages appear to
outweigh the disadvantages in terms of social and environmental signifi-
cance. In addition, the negative impact of increased control can be par-
tially mitigated. This section will introduce legislative proposals that
would capitalize on the advantages while attempting to minimize the
possible negative effects.
A. Amending Referendum Laws
The first and most important change should concern those provi-
sions of self-government legislation that deal with referenda. More
specifically, the current referendum articles should be expanded to all
municipal governments to control the location of infrastructure projects
of national importance within the borders of the municipality if the
municipality can establish that the project presents a serious threat to the
environment and livelihood of the local community. For the amendment
to be effective, the local governments should be given wide discretion in
making this determination. Needless to say, in accordance with the prin-
Constitution Rejected, USA TODAY, June 2,2005, http'//www.usatoday.com/news/world/
2005-06-01-netherlands-eux.htm.
See EUROPA: Rapid-Press Release, supra note 116.
129 Europa.eu, supra note 117.
130 Id.
1 See discussion supra Part III.
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ciples of democracy, the national government would be free to challenge
this determination through the judiciary.
On the other hand, national government should retain the ability
to block a municipal decision if it makes the determination that the local
harm of going with the original national proposal is clearly outweighed
by the harm to the national economy or other interested governmental
units from the municipal proposal. This determination must also be sub-
ject to judicial review.
Secondly, municipalities should be allowed to block the construction
of infrastructure projects on their territories altogether through a refer-
endum if they can show that there is a less environmentally harmful, yet
economically viable, alternative. Because the potential consequences to
the project and to the national economy would generally be greater in this
case, the decision regarding whether the municipality has met its burden
of proof should rest with national government, but should also be subject
to a judicial challenge.
Lastly, Bulgaria should amend its current referendum law to allow
for the results to be considered valid even when less than 50% of the eli-
gible voters have participated.'32 A threshold requirement of the sort that
is currently in place seems likely to discourage voters because they may sus-
pect that any efforts to be a part of the political process would be in vain.
B. Other Legislative and Policy Changes
In addition to the amendments of self-government legislation, there
are a number of other potential legislative changes that would increase the
benefit of greater municipal control. One such change could be introduced
to existing energy regulations. As previously mentioned, Bulgaria's energy
law currently provides that the layout of a pipeline be proposed by the
Ministry of Energy and Energy Resources.'33 It is clear that an amendment
to the act that would allow for greater local government involvement at
this early planning stage of a project would prevent many of the potential
conflicts and the costs associated with them that usually emerge once the
layout has been approved by the Council of Ministers.'
132 For an explanation on how the current referendum law works, see Void Referendum
in Bulgaria's Burgas Rejects Overwhelmingly Oil Pipeline, supra note 34.
'" Law on Energy art. 200, available at www.erranet.org/index.php?name=OE-eLibrary&
file=download&id=2946&keret=N&showheader=N.
" These costs can come as a result of court challenges, intentional bureaucratic delays,
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Another useful legislative change could be adopted in the context
of the countries' environmental laws. To mitigate the financial and human
resource constraints currently experienced by local governments,135 these
laws should require national governments to provide full disclosure of any
environmental impact assessments performed with respect to the pro-ject. Furthermore, if a municipality can show that a potential harm to its
environment exists, the laws should require that national governments
provide the resources necessary to evaluate the actual economic and envi-
ronmental impact to that municipality.'36
The existing legislation does little to encourage corroboration be-
tween the different levels of government. An important reason for this is
that the legislation fails to recognize that municipalities lack the proper
incentive to support projects of national importance. While Burgas and
Primorye may benefit from increased port fees at their terminal cites, the
economic benefit that will be received by the majority of the governmental
units involved in pipeline projects is not clear.'37 Therefore, the legislation
should be amended to provide for profit sharing from infrastructure proj-
ects. For example, a municipality that hosts a portion of an oil pipeline
should be allowed to receive a portion of the fees received by the national
government. Such an amendment would give the municipalities a stake
in the project and would likely decrease conflicts over the proposed layout
of the project. Furthermore, it would allow local governments to use this
new source of revenue to cure some of the environmental harms incurred
as a result of the construction.
National governments should take action to facilitate knowledge and
information exchange between the municipal units. This would allow local
strikes and other forms of protest directed against the infrastructure projects and led by
municipal government leaders.
135 See Rural Regions Development: From General Problems to Specific Opportunities,
supra note 86.
" The evaluation could be conducted by a panel of independent experts that is selected
and approved by both the local and national levels of government to ensure fairness and
lack of bias.
... In January of 2008, the Minister of Regional Development and Public Works met with
mayors of municipalities along the route of the pipeline. During the meeting, the repre-
sentatives of the local governments were assured that they will be allowed to retain part
of the funds that Bulgaria will receive from the project. However, this promise has not
yet been backed by a specific contractual agreement. See Spasena Baramova, Minister
Gagaouzov Met with Mayors of Municipalities Along Bourgas-Alexandroupolis Route,
SOFIA ECHO, Jan. 24, 2008, http://www.soflaecho.com/article/minister-gagaouzov-met-
with-mayors-of-municipalities-along-bourgas-alexandroupolis.route/id_27218/catid_5.
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governments to use each other's best practices, share ideas, and minimize
costs on evaluating the economic and environmental benefits and harms
of infrastructure projects. Such an information exchange could be achieved
by replicating the World Bank's Local Government Information Network
("LOGIN") project. 38 LOGIN is an internet-based tool which allows munic-
ipalities to exchange information on budgets, legislation and best prac-
tices. 3 s This tool would grant access to outside organizations that serve
local governments through various consulting and training programs. 40
The World Bank has already entered into agreements with such organiza-
tions in Bulgaria' but a more active participation in the project on the
part of the national government would undoubtedly facilitate and accel-
erate the process.
Russia could also benefit from creating a strong and independent
national association of municipalities. Bulgaria has already established
such an association with the support ofUSAID.' This association has been
a powerful force in building the "image and stature of local government."4
More specifically, it has actively participated in the national legislative
process and was able to secure a greater share of tax revenues for the use
of municipalities from the national government."' It has also frequently
organized information dissemination and advocacy efforts. 4 '
Finally, the countries of Eastern Europe must work on legislative
changes that would immunize their local governments from improper
pressures by their national governments. 4 ' Only then will their citizens
have confidence in the political system and be more willing to engage in
the self-government process. At least in the case of Bulgaria, this change
should begin with granting municipalities greater power to tax their
citizens directly and to be able to have full control over their budgets.147
13 SeeWorldbank.org, Project Summary: Local Government Information Network, http://
www.worldbank.org/html]prddr/trans/nd00j an01/pg3 4 .htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2008).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See id.
142 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., USAID's
EXPERIENCE IN DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE 7 (2000),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and_governance/publications/
pdfs/pnach302.pdf.
143 Id.
1 Id. at 8.
145 See id.
14 See Muravei Privatizira Mestnite Bjudjeti, supra note 51.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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CONCLUSION
The main issue this Note considered whether local governments
in Bulgaria and Russia should be given a greater role in determining the
location of pipelines and other important infrastructure projects on their
territories. It focused on the construction of the Burgas-Alexandroupoli
and the Pacific pipelines to illustrate the most common context in which
conflicts between national and municipal authorities arise and discussed
the existing legislation concerning the issue in the two countries.'" Based
on that analysis, the Note concluded that the existing legal frameworks
do not permit meaningful involvement by sub-national governments in
projects of national importance.
The Note then turned to examining the potential advantages and
disadvantages of amending the laws in Bulgaria and Russia to allow for
sharing the responsibility for important projects. 49 And while municipali-
ties are faced with a number of important problems, such as corruption and
financial and human resource limitations, the potential benefits, along
with the possibility for mitigating some of these problems, clearly suggest
that greater municipal participation would be helpful for environmental
protection. Furthermore, the increased involvement would probably be
economically beneficial to all parties that participate in the project. 5 °
In the following parts, the Note considered ideas for establishing
a more successful relationship between the different levels of government
by examining practices and legislation from Australia and the European
Union.' 5' Australia, like Bulgaria and Russia, places issues of "national
importance" under the authority of the national government. However,
the law in that country provides a clear and narrow definition of this term
and leaves everything that falls outside of that definition to the Australian
states. 52
The European Union provides some innovative solutions to in-
creasing the role of local governments in projects that affect their con-
stituents. Subsidiarity, which is now accepted as one of the fundamental
principles of the Union, prohibits EU institutions from taking action on
any policy issue, unless they can establish that they their solution is more
See supra Parts I, II.
149 See supra Part III.
150 Id.
... See supra Parts IV, V.
"' See supra Part IV.
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